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Abstract 
The discussion on the delimitation, and 
hence definition of 'outer space' as an 
area, and subsidiary to that on the need 
or desirability to have such a 
delimitation and definition, harks back 
to the beginning of the space age. Until 
then, it had been quite clear that every 
state exercised full sovereignty over the 
sky above its territory and territorial 
waters, whilst no one felt the need for 
finding out how high upward such 
sovereignty would exactly extend. 
With Sputnik, for the first time the 
practical question arose however 
whether there indeed was an upper 
limit to airspace, and if so, where it 
would lie. The debate since then has 
mainly been a theoretical one, partly 
because several important space-faring 
nations did not consider it necessary or 
even appropriate to establish a legally 
relevant fixed boundary between 'outer 
space' and 'airspace' as 'geographical' 
areas for human activities. 
It is the main thrust of this paper, 
firstly, that this situation is changing. It 
is contended that in particular the 
recent adventures of SpaceShipOne 
which for a brief moment 'dipped' into 
outer space - if one agrees that outer 
space begins at an altitude of 100 km -
bring the question of where 'outer 
space' begins back on the table. 
Consequently, wherever that question 
is indeed considered relevant, in the 
absence of any international agreement 
on such a delimitation or definition, 
viz. the need or desirability to establish 
one, other legally relevant means are 
sought to deal with the issue. 
Secondly, such development of 
alternate means has, in turn, its own 
indirect impact at the international 
legal plane. Such various developments 
as Australian national law referring to a 
lower boundary for outer space and the 
need to choose for certification of 
SpaceShipOne and crew may, in the 
end, through the mechanism of 
formation of international custom and 
opinio juris, lead to a customary legal 
rule. 
The current paper thus, firstly, briefly 
recapitulates the discussion of the last 
decades on delimitation and definition 
of outer space, secondly, refers to a few 
events which directly touch upon this 
issue, thirdly, tries to analyse the legal 
aspects of the solutions chosen to deal 
with that, including the vexing question 
of formation of customary law, and 
finally tries to draw some conclusions 
with respect to the overarching 
question: if the sky is the limit, where 
does it end? 
1. Introduction 
In October 2004, a privately-paid, -built 
and -piloted vehicle by the name of 
SpaceShipOne achieved a major feat -
winning the X-prize ofUS$ 10 million, 
as well as getting thousands to sign up, 
in its aftermath, for a place in Sir 
Richard Branson's future Virgin 
Galactic seats for a trip higher upwards 
than any aircraft has ever flown. I 
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Behind all the excitement and the 
discussions as to what this means for 
the future of space travel and space 
activities more in general, it also raised 
once more a question hitherto largely 
considered to be of a theoretical nature: 
where does outer space begin? Where 
would the territorial sovereignty of the 
underlying state, providing an easy 
legal tool for controlling such activities, 
extinguish; where by contrast would a 
different legal approach be necessary 
for controlling purposes in what 
basically constitutes a global 
commons? 
2. Legal history 
Many experts have discussed where 
outer space begins (often as part of the 
broader issue of the definition of outer 
space) ever since 1957. In that year, the 
orbits of Sputnik I posed the vexing 
question as to whether individual states 
could 'use' their well-established 
sovereignty over the airspace above 
their territories2 to prohibit man-made 
space objects to be present above such 
territories. 
The quick fonnalisation of one of the 
fundamental rules of international space 
law, that outer space itself remained 
outside any sovereignty as a terra 
communis,3 seemed to reinforce the 
need to establish a clear boundary 
between the two areas subject to 
regimes with such fundamental 
differences. Precedents could be 
derived from the discussion on the law 
of the sea. The 1958 treaties negotiated 
in Geneva dealt with the demarcation of 
territorial seas (where the sovereignty 
of the coastal states applied 
comprehensively, with the exception of 
the famed 'right of innocent passage') 
versus high seas (which were basically 
open to all states and regulated only at 
the internationallevel).4 
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It soon turned out, however, that the 
newly-established Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) could not establish any 
consensus on the boundary question. 
Different states (and different experts, 
legal as well as non-legal) came 
forward with different proposals as to 
where the legal borderline would have 
to be drawn, variously based on 
scientific and/or practical 
considerations. Some adherents of a 
'spatialist' approach, in addition, made 
a case for a more subtle zoning system, 
creating (an) intennediate space(s) 
between air space and outer space 
properly speaking, with combined or 
mixed characteristics. Even more 
importantly, amongst others some of 
the major space-faring nations 
considered establishment of a boundary 
premature, to say the least. They were 
hesitant to create artificial legal 
boundaries as long as the possibility of 
later technological developments 
ignoring a particular boundary chosen 
continued to loom large. More 
principally, finally, there were the 
adherents of full-fledged 'functionalist' 
theories, arguing that the application of 
the one or the other system of law 
should hinge only on the purpose of the 
activity and the characterisation of the 
hardware involved - air law for aircraft, 
space law for space objects. 
As long as those vehicles that would 
clearly qualify only as aircraft remained 
at altitudes far below the lowest orbits 
that other vehicles clearly qualifying as 
space objects could maintain, and as 
long as any trajectory of the latter to 
(and from) their orbits would not run 
through another state's sovereign 
airspace, the question remained, indeed, 
a theoretical one. 
Nevertheless, from time to time it 
raised its head. Thus, the absence of 
any established legal boundary may 
have been partly responsible for a 
handful of equatorial countries claiming 
in 1976, through the famous Bogota 
Declaration, that those parts of the geo-
stationary orbit (at an altitude of some 
35,800 km) which were 'above' their 
respective territories were subject to 
their respective sovereignty. Apart from 
difficult legal arguments pertaining to 
the physical similarities between the 
geo-stationary orbit and the areas 
surrounding it which nobody 
contested were outer space - it was in 
particular the political opposition of the 
large majority of non-equatorial states 
which, in the end, caused such claims 
to be silently discarded or at least 
watered down fundamentally.5 
Then, there was the advent of the space 
shuttle in the 80's: a vehicle that 
functioned partly as a space object, 
partly as an aircraft. And while the US 
version, operating ever since, 
apparently never traversed the airspaces 
over foreign states on its way to or from 
orbit (which few would contest was in 
outer space, regardless of the absence 
of any borderline), the Soviet Buran, 
which flew only once, did have to 
return over various African countries 
and Turkey at altitudes which could 
arguably be seen as upper airspaces of 
those states - defined in a recent Study 
by the International Academy of 
Astronautics (lAA) by reference to a 
100 km altitude.6 
The Buran flight was unmanned, and 
never repeated afterwards anyhow, so 
the United States had to make their own 
choice regarding how to treat the space 
shuttle in legal terms. Focusing on the 
shuttle's aim of taking humans into 
outer space and back rather than to and 
from a different spot on earth, its being 
launched instead of taking off, the large 
phase where it effectively continued to 
operate as a spacecraft, as well as the 
desirability of qualifying its crew as 
astronauts rather than pilots, the US 
government quickly came to the 
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conclusion that the space shuttle was 
equivalent to a spacecraft (space 
object). This meant, inter alia, its 
launches would be registered under the 
Registration Convention7, not under the 
applicable ICAO regime. No other state 
protested, so that one can now safely 
assume that, indeed, the space shuttle 
legally speaking is a spacecraft. All 
this, however, of course did not solve 
the delimitation issue as such. 
3. International discussions -
COPUOS and the ITU 
Thus, from time to time discussions in 
the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS 
reverted back to the issue of 
delimitation. For example first the 
Soviet Union, then Russia, repeatedly 
put proposals on the table to come to an 
agreement of legally establishing the 
boundary at an altitude of 100 km. The 
rationale for choosing that altitude, 
apart from the nice round figure, was 
mainly that aircraft, as the main subject 
matter of most of international (as well 
as national) air law, would never be 
able to reach such altitudes in view of 
their dependency, for purposes of lift, 
upon a density of air not available in 
those regions. Conversely, space 
objects orbiting the earth (a major 
target for space law) could not sensibly 
do that below such an altitude, as the 
atmosphere from their perspective was 
too dense for staying 'up' in their orbit, 
the attendant atmospheric drag no 
longer being compensated by the 
centrifugal forces resulting from their 
velocity.8 Still, such discussions did not 
lead to any agreement for reasons 
indicated earlier. 
Debate on the issue resurfaced once 
more when the Legal Subcommittee 
addressed a questionnaire to its member 
states on the issue of 'aerospace 
planes,.9 This conceptual follow-up to 
space shuttles would enjoy double 
functionality (as aircraft transporting 
passengers from city to city, as 
spacecraft orbiting a satellite or taking 
crew to or from the space station) and 
hybrid operationality (using jet 
propulsion when in airspace, rocket 
propulsion when in outer space), which 
brought the debate on spatialism-
versus-functionalist back to the table -
and in its wake also the question of 
delimitation and definition of outer 
space and such sub-issues as existence 
of a possible 'right of innocent passage' 
for spacecraft through another state's 
airspace. 
The particular Russian proposal to deal 
with the issue was presented in 1992, 
the questionnaire drafted on the basis 
thereof distributed in 1995, and the first 
comprehensive analysis of the replies 
presented in a note by the COPUOS 
Secretariat two years later still. IO Even 
more tellingly, the response was 
considered to be rather meagre at the 
time (at that point only 15 states having 
taken the trouble of answering), and the 
questionnaire remained on the agenda 
basically until today. I I 
Summarily surveying the answers that 
were provided, the views remained as 
varied as they had been before. Yet, on 
a number of occasions it became clear 
that states continued to struggle with 
the issue of respective application of air 
law and space law. A few points were 
specifically worthy of note from this 
perspective. 
Firstly, Pakistan referred to "altitudes 
lower than between 90 and 100 km", 
where a spacecraft was "bound to decay 
within the next orbit" and thus, in the 
language of the COPUOS Secretariat's 
summary, would make it "subject to 
rules of air law".12 
Secondly, the Russian Federation 
"observed that international practice 
( ... ) was evolving, whereby State 
sovereignty did not extend to space 
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located above the orbit of least perigee 
of an artificial Earth satellite 
(approximately 100 kilometres above 
sea level). In cases where flights have 
occurred below this level, State have 
furnished, on the basis of goodwill, 
relevant information to States whose 
territory was overflown".13 Relevant 
"provisions of international customary 
law in this field were evolving", 
according to the same state.14 
Germany finally adorned an extended 
analysis of re-entry trajectories of the 
US space shuttle with an interesting 
graphical depiction. It showed the area 
between 100 and 60 km altitude as a 
shaded zone (the lower altitude being 
referred to as being a mere 14-15 
minutes before touchdown), placing the 
entry below a 100 km altitude at about 
30 minutes prior to touchdown, and in 
the accompanying text equating this to 
"re-entry into the Earth's 
atmosphere".15 It needs to be added 
here, that a relatively large number of 
states in their answers referred to "the 
atmosphere" as the area where (as far 
as spatialism was applied or considered 
to apply) air law would rule. 
To wrap up the summary picture at the 
international level, as indicated another 
area of international law where 
discussions on the delimitation and 
definition had, at some time, been 
rather intense concerned the 
geostationary orbit. Here, the Bogota 
Declaration of 1976 forced states to 
face the claim that parts of the 
geostationary orbit, almost 36,000 km 
out, were basically part of the sovereign 
territory of the underlying state. 
This discussion for a large part took 
place in the context of the ITU, in view 
of the paramount role of the ITU in 
coordinating the use of slots in that 
orbit for satellite communication 
purposes. It is noteworthy, therefore, 
that the ITU Radio Regulations in the 
definition section (Article S 1) was also 
confronted with the need to deal with 
this issue. Thus, a "space station" for 
lTV purposes was defined to be "an 
object which is beyond, is intended to 
go beyond, or has been beyond the 
major portion of the Earth's 
atmosphere".16 Likewise, in defining a 
"spacecraft" reference was made to that 
- rather vague and unhelpful -
definition of what 'space' should be 
taken to mean.17 
One can hardly blame the lTV however 
for not being more precise when at the 
general international level states were 
unable to agree even on the need for a 
specific definition and/or delimitation 
of outer space. The result, however, 
was that the attendant insecurity and 
imprecision still remained. 
4. National (space) law on the issue 
Apart from the discussions within 
UNCOPVOS and the ITV, that is at the 
international level, the issue of 
delimitation of (national) airspace and 
(everybody's) outer space also became 
a matter for deliberation at the level of 
national law. With the growing private 
involvement in space and space-related 
activities especially since the late 80's, 
states were increasingly confronted 
with the need to legally monitor and 
control such private activities and 
started developing national space laws 
to deal with them. 
In a number of crucial respects there is 
no detailed international guidance 
regarding how to implement 
international duties on the domestic 
plane - also pertaining, as briefly 
analysed above, to the issue of 
delimitation. Not only on a particular 
borderline between air space and outer 
space, but even on the need to have 
one, states diverged fundamentally in 
their opinions so as to preclude any 
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international authoritative statement in 
this respect from becoming possible. 
At the same time, this did not erase the 
abovementioned need and desire for 
particular states to deal with private 
space activities by means of national 
law; and when states can find no 
authoritative international guidance on 
the issue, they go and find a solution on 
their own - with all the possible 
fragmentation resulting. 
In trying to establish legal control over 
relevant private space activities, 
furthermore, there is an inherent 
tendency for states to base themselves 
on 'spatialist' notions. Whereas a 
private person or company would be 
likely to prefer a legal approach which 
combines all applicable rules to his 
activity in one handy regime, regardless 
of what takes place where (in other 
words, would prefer a 'functionalist' 
regime as much as possible), a state 
will be naturally inclined to delineate 
its competencies and the exercise 
thereof principally by means of 
geographical borders. Territorial 
sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction, 
more important and effective than all 
other forms of jurisdiction, are key to a 
state's existence, and any particular 
state is even defined in international 
law by reference to a territory over 
which it exercises effective control. The 
history of inter-state disputes is replete 
with disagreements over territorial 
borders, which started to include the 
seas and oceans as soon as borders 
became applied to those areas as well. 
When states, therefore, consider 
implementing national space law to 
apply the international space treaties on 
the domestic plane, naturally they tend 
to use territorial jurisdiction to define 
the scope of such laws. With it, at least 
in theory, comes a desire to delineate 
where such jurisdiction applies. And 
indeed, amongst the states so far having 
dealt with domestic legislation, several 
have considered themselves forced to 
somehow deal with the issue of 
delimitation and definition of outer 
space - much as others have simply 
chosen, for the time being, to 
circumvent it.18 
For example in Germany, where the 
potential need for licensing private 
spacecraft has not yet led to a distinct 
national space law, the Federal German 
Aviation Code in § 1 (2) provides that 
"spacecraft, rockets and similar flying 
objects are regarded as aircraft as long 
as they are in airspace", with the result 
of course that the other provisions of 
the Code then become applicable.19 
As a matter of fact, already the very 
first national act on space, the 1958 US 
Act establishing NASA, defines 
"space" with a view to "space 
activities" as the area "outside the 
earth's atmosphere".2o The atmosphere, 
it can be reiterated, is seen by many 
states and experts as equivalent to the 
area where air law applies. Until 
recently, the national space law coming 
closest to properly dealing with the 
issue was the South African one, where 
"outer space" was defined as "the space 
above the surface of the earth from a 
height at which it is in practice possible 
to operate an object in an orbit around 
the earth".21 Keeping in mind amongst 
others the relevant statement taken 
from the Pakistani answer to the 
COPUOS questionnaire as quoted 
above, this would seem to point at a 
borderline at some 90 to 100 km 
altitude indeed, even if the South 
African government carefully refrained 
from quoting any figure on this. 
This last - bold - step was taken by the 
Australian government. The original 
1998 Act22 did not yet include any 
figure, or even an attempt to define 
outer space, along the lines of the 
Pakistani answer or the South-African 
Act. "Outer space" was simply referred 
to as such, e.g. in the definitions of 
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"launch", "return" and "space object". 23 
In 2002, however, the Act was 
amended. Henceforth, the definitions of 
"launch", "return" and "space object" 
replaced the reference to "outer space" 
with the phrase "an area beyond the 
distance of 1 00 km above mean sea 
level".24 
The Australian authorities explicitly 
claimed this clear reference not to 
constitute any precedent or to prejudge 
in any sense the discussion at the 
international level - it was supposed to 
be a boundary for internal, domestic 
purposes only. 25 In other words: the 
Australian government excused itself 
for considering it necessary to quote a 
borderline for domestic legislative 
purposes, and kept its options open to 
immediately change that provision if 
ever it would be authoritatively agreed 
upon at the international level to 
establish a different boundary, or to not 
establish any boundary at all. 
From a customary law perspective 
these developments certainly raise the 
question whether, at the national level, 
acceptance is slowly building that (a) 
some legal boundary will ultimately be 
necessary for states to create the legal 
certainty both they themselves and their 
private entrepreneurs crave for, and (b) 
that such a boundary would or should 
be situated at an altitude of 100 km or 
so. To the extent such acceptance 
becomes part of law and regulation, and 
would be expressed in addition by 
relevant official statements in COPUOS 
and/or the answers to COPUOS 
questionnaires moreover, it could then 
certainly come to constitute the state 
practice and contribute to the opinio 
juris as the two elements that together 
make up customary law. Perhaps more 
thorough research would unearth more 
growing acceptance still, but at any rate 
a trend seems to become visible. 
So far, so good - one could still wonder 
to what extent such a precise borderline 
made sense from a practical point of 
view, that is: had any realistic effect on 
the handling by governments of 
relevant space activities. 
5. SpaceShipOne 
and recent US legal activities 
All that changed with a Big Bang in 
October 2004 with the X-prize being 
won. This was not just about 'a' private 
space activity requiring some form of 
legal control not necessarily having to 
deal with any boundary between 
airspace and outer space. Here, that 
boundary was key to the whole 
undertaking. After all, the decisive -
winning - element of SpaceShipOne's 
achievement was its presence twice 
within three weeks above an altitude 
broadly advertised as 'in outer space' -
an altitude expressly quantified as 100 
km. Of course, a mere advertisement by 
a private company cannot achieve the 
feat of constituting or establishing a 
fact of (international) customary law. 
But one is immediately reminded of 
NASA awarding astronaut status to 
those having been further away from 
the earth's surface than 100 km. 
So the achievements of SpaceShipOne 
immediately raised assorted questions 
as to the legal treatment of similar 
ventures - trips - in the future (first 
with Virgin Galactic, then probably 
with others as well), in this case from 
within US jurisdiction - which does, 
however, not extend to outer space in 
the same manner as it extends to US 
airspace; so where does the one begin 
and the other end? 
Of course, the US government could 
maintain its legal approach and refuse 
to refer to any specific borderline in its 
domestic legislation. It could well treat 
any private flight launched from US 
territory as just another launch, the 
spacecraft involved being subject to US 
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jurisdiction on the basis of US territory 
being used for the launch alternatively 
US registration of the space object, and 
not on the basis of its being in US 
airspace (which would directly have 
triggered the haunting perspective that 
private business, in every instance 
where the US government would 
determine such a boundary in such a 
manner as to encapsulate the whole 
flight within its national airspace for 
purposes of exerclsmg territorial 
jurisdiction, would respond by sending 
space tourists higher yet precisely 
because these tourists want to be in 
outer space!). 
So far, indeed the US authorities have 
followed such an approach. 
SpaceShipOne almost of necessity was 
given an ad hoc-treatment, but the 
perspective of more prizes, more 
private flights and certainly more and 
more passengers lining up and paying 
up with Sir Richard Branson coaxed the 
US government into more substantial 
legislative action. 
The result so far was, essentially, the 
Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act of2004.26 It amended 
the various relevant Sections of the 
existing part of the US Code (Title 49) 
on launch activities and space 
transportation27, to the extent of adding 
the concepts of "space flight 
participants", "suborbital trajectory" 
and "permit" (in addition to the existing 
concept of "license"), all to cater for the 
general inclusion of SpaceShipOne-like 
flights in the licensing regime of the 
Act. 28 In addition, "experimental 
permits" could now also be handed out, 
the main difference being that this last 
category could not apply to flights 
"carrying any property or human being 
for compensation or hire", only to 
flights preparing for such events.29 
In both cases, effectively a waiver from 
the Section on "liability insurance and 
financial responsibility requirements,,30 
was construed, allowing a 'permittee' 
or 'experimental permittee' to forego 
expensive insurance - at the price of 
informing crew and space flight 
participants of the absence of US 
certification of the spacecraft and the 
attendant risks in flying to outer space, 
allowing such passengers to take their 
own risk-abating measures if they 
would so desire.31 
In other words, for the time being a 
light regulatory regime was established 
to stimulate the take-off of private 
spaceflight activities in the wake of 
SpaceShipOne without fundamentally 
changing the underlying philosophy 
that it would be premature to establish 
any borderline between (US) airspace 
and outer space. For the time being, as 
the period of application of the 
Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act specifically allowed 
the Secretary of Transportation as of 
eight years from its enactment to 
propose new safety regulations, takin§ 
the then-state of play into account.3 
Also, the Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act specifically calls for 
studies on risk sharing, international 
competition and safety issues, with a 
view to allowing updates of the Act if 
US private space tourism is to be 
protected or otherwise re-regulated.33 
6. Towards the future ... 
The main question is, then: is this 
current approach going to remain 
sufficient? The United States 
government may well have avoided the 
establishment of any boundary between 
airspace and outer space, creating what 
amounts to a functionally-based regime 
for space tourism whilst using its 
territorial jurisdiction over the launch 
site, but that might work satisfactorily 
only as long as such launches would 
take place exclusively from US 
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territory. Launches conducted from 
elsewhere overflying US territory, once 
becoming seriously possible, could no 
longer be legally controlled in that way 
as long as they would not fly at such a 
low altitude that no one would contest 
this to be US airspace, that is below a 
zone where it will be difficult or even 
impossible for a spacecraft to operate. 
Already in regard of Sir Richard 
Branson it might be noted that he is a 
UK citizen, and Virgin Galactic has 
been established in the United 
Kingdom. In other words: that state 
may soon have to be less evasive than 
'defining' "outer space" merely as to 
"include( ... ) the moon and other 
celestial bodies". 34 Will the United 
Kingdom, or for that matter the Russian 
Federation (whose Mir space station 
had after all in 2001 constituted the 
original target for the first space tourist-
ever Dennis Tito) - both not the least 
amongst the space-faring nations! - be 
tempted to follow the Australian 
example, in view of all the other 
references to 100 km altitude collected 
in the present paper? Australia may 
have modestly and explicitly limited 
the scope of its own delimitation so as 
to preclude anyone from perceiving this 
to provide some form of precedent - if 
other states would copy such a 'non-
precedent' (which, after all, will not 
have come about totally arbitrarily) 
Australia obviously cannot stop them, 
and the country nolens volens may have 
provided a basis for establishment of a 
relevant customary rule. 
And what happens if a state clinging to 
non-delimitation would find a foreign-
registered, foreign-launched private 
passenger spacecraft to be present 
vertically above its territory at an 
altitude neither unequivocally 
considered airspace nor unequivocally 
considered outer space? Would it feel 
itself entitled to apply for example tort 
law on a territorial basis to liability 
issues possibly arising? Or would it be 
content to wait and see whether its 
interests, persons or property would 
actually be harmed? And if that, in tum, 
would mean any event vertically above 
its territory might become subject to its 
jurisdiction, would that not stifle the 
interests in a flourishing private space 
industry? What if other nations start 
applying similar all-out legal 
approaches on a basis of reciprocity? 
Ultimately, the development of private 
space flight depends on legal certainty 
and predictability. Now that the means 
to unequivocally establish one's 
position in three dimensions relative to 
the earth with GPS, GLONASS and 
soon Galileo are within everyone's 
reach, should we not work towards an 
agreement on establishing a boundary 
line before possible legal disputes 
would become a nasty political reality? 
Over the past centuries, global fishing, 
global shipping transport and sea-based 
communications have flourished 
immensely partly because a certain 
Hugo Grotius proclaimed the freedom 
of the high seas - which needed a 
determination where those high seas 
began and ended. Notwithstanding that 
those boundaries have shifted over 
time, have become more complex with 
in-between zones and have led to a 
number of border disputes; who is to 
deny that the absence of an off-shore 
non-tangible boundary out at sea would 
have produced far worse results? 
Perhaps the sky is the limit to private 
spaceflight in economic terms, but if 
the legal certainty and justice is to be 
ensured which allows for a beneficial 
and balanced development thereof, we 
should delineate - and hence limit! -
the extent to which territorial 
jurisdiction could reach for the sky. We 
should finally start working on a 
boundary between the 'high seas' of 
outer space (and then provide for an 
appropriate transportation regime for 
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that international area) and the 
sovereign area of national airspaces. In 
other words, it is time to seriously 
reconsider whether we should not 
firmly but flexibly establish the 
boundary between airspaces and outer 
space at an altitude of 100 km, 
following the considerable number of 
instances where this number has 
already been referred to. After all, what 
is wrong with a nice round figure? 
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